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The enactment of the major environmental legislation of the 1970s,
commencing with the Clean Air Act' and National Environmental Policy
Act,2 was very much a nonpartisan reform. Presidents Nixon, Ford and
Carter supported the bills which became the phalanx of environmental
protection in the United States,3 and supported the appropriations needed
for effective implementation of these laws. 4 Their leadership was accom-
panied by bipartisan support in Congress for environmental legislation.
In 1980, for the first time since environmental protection emerged as a
prime public concern in the 1960s, the two chief presidential candidates
divided over the issue. Deregulation of the environment became a dominant
theme in the campaign of Ronald Reagan, and as President he reversed the
machinery his predecessors, and preceding Congresses, had built.5 President
Reagan argued that the health effects of air and water pollution and exposure
to hazardous chemicals had been grossly overrated, 6 and urged that the
federal government relinquish to the states its long-standing control of lands
in the West under federal statutes that had restricted mining, oil extraction,
and the clear-cutting of timber.7
* B.A. University of Pennsylvania, 1955; J.D. Columbia Law School, 1958. The author,
formerly Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Environmental Protection Bureau, New
York State Attorney General's Office (1970-78), is now Professor of Law, St. John's University
School of Law. He is the author of a casebook, ENVIRONMNTAL LAW: CAsEs AND MATERUALS
(Associated Faculty Press, 1985) and numerous articles on environmental law. He is indebted
to Guy R. Mazza (St. John's Law School 1989) for research assistance in preparing this article.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370a (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
3. These included, in addition to the Clean Air Act and National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969, the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6991i (1982 & Supp. IV
1986); the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1982 &
Supp. IV 1986); the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1982); as well as
other legislation.
4. President Nixon's ill-fated attempt in 1972 to impound Congressionally authorized
funds was declared unconstitutional in Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35 (1975); see
also Impoundment Control Act of 1974, 2 U.S.C. §§ 681-688 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
5. See Costle, Environmental Regulation and Regulatory Reform, 57 WASH. L. REV.
409 (1982).
6. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1980, at A25, col. 1 (responding to President
Reagan's pronouncement that trees cause pollution, a state Public Interest Research Group
spokesperson predicted that President Reagan doubtless "is going to put emission standards
on trees").
7. See Babbitt, Federalism and the Environment: An Intergovernmental Perspective of
the Sagebrush Rebellion, 12 ENvTrL. L. 847 (1982).
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Deregulation of the environment was part of a larger antiregulatory
agenda that antedated the 1980 election.' However, environmental deregu-
lation sharply differs from the deregulation of transportation, broadcasting,
and other traditionally regulated industries. First, the federal environmental
statutes were enacted recently and in response to overwhelming public
insistence. Surveys before and after 1980 show that the vast majority of
Americans demand vigorous enforcement of environmental laws. 9 Second,
the link between environmental protection and public health is firmly
established. Third, the economic benefits to the public advanced for dereg-
ulating in other areas, such as cheaper air fares and greater variety in
broadcasting through increased competition, have no real application to
jettisoning environmental controls.
Nonetheless, the 1980 election resulted in a weakening of environmental
protection at the federal level. President Reagan appointed Anne Gorsuch
as administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and James
Watt as Secretary of the Interior. Each were zealous myrmidons of dereg-
ulation. Administrator Gorsuch drastically reduced the EPA's budget and
dismantled entire Agency programs, such as noise control.' 0 Secretary Watt
forthrightly proclaimed his intent to curb "excessive, burdensome and
counter-productive" regulations."
The Administration justified these measures as part of its broader
antiregulation posture. President Reagan promulgated an Executive Order
which provided that "regulatory action shall not be undertaken unless the
potential benefits to society from the regulation outweigh the potential costs
to society."'' 2 Of course, the benefits and costs of a regulation are largely
judgmental. Measured subjectively, the costs of nearly any regulation may
appear to outweigh its benefits. This is especially so in environmental
protection, where the costs to industry of safeguards are far more readily
8. As early as January 1980, yielding somewhat to this assault, President Carter had
announced his intention to "get rid of those regulations which are unwarranted." Wash. Post,
Jan. 12, 1980, at C7, col. 2.
9. A Harris Poll in May 1981 showed that 86% of those polled want the Clean Air
Act, and 93% want the Clean Water Act, kept in place or strengthened. Americans Do Not
Want to Weaken Air, Water Acts, Harris Survey Finds, 12 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 9, at 280
(June 26, 1981).
10. See N.Y. Times, July 9, 1982, at A22, col. 1; Christian Sci. Mon., Oct. 19, 1981,
at 13, col. I; Wash. Post, Aug. 15, 1981, at D8, col. 2. President Reagan originally intended
to pare the EPA fiscal year 1982 budget by more than 74% (from $5.3 billion to $1.39
billion), but was compelled to agree to a smaller reduction. Reagan's Proposed Fiscal 1982
Budget Would Cut EPA Funding to $1.39 Billion, 11 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 46, at 2083
(Mar. 13, 1981) [hereinafter Reagan's Proposed Budget].
11. Wash. Post, Apr. 17, 1982, at Al, col. 4; Wash. Post, May 24, 1981, at Al, col.
3.
12. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982). This order was foreshadowed by a
Heritage Foundation study of the EPA in 1980 that recommended revoking all regulations of
the Agency that do not "reflect a balance in the pursuit of all society's goals." See Heritage
Foundation Recommendations Include Suspending Statutory Deadlines, 11 Env't Rep. (BNA)
No. 31, at 1103 (Nov. 28, 1980) [hereinafter Heritage Foundation Recommendations].
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documented than the benefits to public health. 3 As Representative James
Florio of New Jersey, who sponsored much of the significant solid and
hazardous waste legislation in Congress, pointed out, during the early 1980s
"the test at EPA was not whether a regulatory system met the statutory
prescription to protect the environment, but rather whether it met the
Administration's ideological regulatory standard"-a standard that "actu-
ally subverted the statutory goals.'
4
Another Reagan Administration innovation was review of EPA and
other environmental regulations by the Office of Management and Budget,
a policy that gives opponents of controls a second chance to argue against
the controls, this time off the public record, and before a much friendlier
forum. '5
Neither Gorsuch nor Watt were able to withstand the barrage of criticism
from Congress, environmental and public health groups, unions, the media,
and citizens generally, culminating in over a million signatures on "Dump
Watt" petitions.' 6 Responding to the public outcry, President Reagan was
obliged to replace Gorsuch with EPA administrators far more concerned
with effective enforcement. At Interior, there was no dramatic turnaround,
but under current Secretary Donald Hodel the decibel level of hostility to
environmental regulation has decreased.
This Article will briefly examine the methods of deregulation employed
by the Reagan Administration in some chief areas of environmental control:
air, water, hazardous waste, toxic chemical regulation, strip-mining, and
use of federal lands. The Article will evaluate the effectiveness of these
programs under a deregulation regime and then offer some conclusions
about the future of environmental regulation.
2. Anm QUALITY
Congress enacted the Clean Air Act17 in 1970'8 after expressly finding
that air pollution "has resulted in mounting dangers to the public health
13. See Costle, supra note 5, at 413-417. Douglas Costle, EPA administrator during the
Carter years, notes that as "there are no statues to honor generals who kept the peace, so
there are no dollar figures to measure harms that never happened." Id. at 417.
14. Florio, Congress as Reluctant Regulator: Hazardous Waste Policy in the 1980's, 3
YALE J. oN REO. 351, 358-59 (1986).
15. See Costle, supra note 5, at 421.
16. Christian Sci. Mon., Oct. 19, 1981, at 13, col. 1. As early as December 1980 outgoing
EPA Administrator Douglas M. Costle had argued that there was no basis for believing that
"people voted against environmental regulation" in 1980, and that most industry chief executive
officers sought "rationality and predictability," not the dismantling of environmental statutes.
See Costle Says New Administration Has No Mandate to Dismantle Laws, 11 Env't Rep.
(BNA) No. 37, at 1395 (Jan. 9, 1981).
17. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
18. The Act was based on several earlier statutes that increasingly recognized the interstate
nature of air pollution and the resultant dangers to public health. See The Air Pollution
Control Act of 1955, Pub. L. No. 84-145, 69 Stat. 322 (1955); Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub.
L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat. 485 (1967).
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and welfare ... ."19 Except for the three federally preempted areas of motor
vehicle emissions, aircraft, and motor vehicle fuels,20 the Act is predicated
on cooperative enforcement between the EPA and the states. The fulcrum
for this enforcement is the State Implementation Plan (SIP) that each state
is required to prepare for EPA approval, which sets forth in detail how
that state is to meet the primary and secondary national ambient air quality
standards for significant pollutants prescribed in the Act. 21 Without the
SIP's, which the states may revise subject to EPA approval, the national
air quality standards are essentially unenforceable. For this reason much
litigation accompanied the adoption of the SIP's, their approval by the
EPA, and attempts by the states to revise them.
22
In 1980 the Heritage Foundation, a politically conservative group of
economic analysts, recommended that the Reagan Administration abandon
the requirement of SIP's and replace them with "case-by-case" decisions.
23
Shortly thereafter the Foundation's pundits advised the President to replace
all environmental standards and discharge limitations with effluent taxes,
dispensing with the "outmoded and inefficient technique of absolute stan-
dards. " 24 The concept of taxing pollution through effluent charges was not
new,'- but was now being advanced as part of a concerted assault on
environmental regulation, along with recommendations to repeal all envi-
ronmental controls that were not "cost-effective.
' 26
These suggestions were followed by proposals to slash the EPA's
budget, 27 directed with particular force at the clean air program. The Reagan
Administration sought severe reductions in air-quality enforcement staff,
and the outright abolition of the Office of Transportation and Land Use
Policy, which deals with the states' programs to regulate air pollution
stemming from motor vehicle traffic in and around major cities. 28 Senator
19. 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(2) (1982).
20. Id. at §§ 7521-7574 (1982).
21. Id. at § 7410. The standards are in section 7409. The importance of the SIP's is
highlighted in Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60 (1975), and
Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246 (1976).
22. See, e.g., Union Elec., 427 U.S. 246 (EPA may not weaken SIP as condition of its
approval); Train, 421 U.S. 60 (state may allow variances for industry in SIP); Friends of the
Earth v. Carey, 535 F.2d 165 (2d Cir. 1976) (state is responsible for enforcing SIP), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 902 (1977).
23. See Heritage Foundation Recommendations, supra note 12, at 1103, 1104. This
recommendation was part of the Heritage Foundation's broader proposal to rescind all
environmental regulations not reflective of "a balance in the pursuit of all society's goals."
See id.
24. General Policy, 11 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 38, at 1616 (Nov. 28, 1980).
25. See, e.g., Lahey, Economic Charges for Environmental Protection: Ocean Dumping
Fees, I 1 ECOLOGY L. Q. 305, 315 (1984) (tracing history of pollution tax back to recommen-
dation of Council of Economic Advisors in Johnson Administration).
26. See Heritage Foundation Recommendations, supra note 12.
27. Reagan's Proposed Budget, supra note 10.
28. Fiscal 1983 Air Program Budget Indicates Diminished EPA Role in Enforcement,
SIPs, 12 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 24, at 710 (Oct. 9, 1981). The transportation-control program
is dealt with at infra note 94.
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Robert Stafford (R-Vt.), the Chairman of the Senate Environment and
Public Works Committee, described these budget cuts as capable of ren-
dering the Clean Air Act and other environmental statutes "just as harmless
as removing the cartridges from a pistol." He noted that "laws need not
be repealed to be ineffectual.
' 29
The axe fell heavily on the EPA's emerging attempts to control acid
rain. Acid rain is the depositing of vast amounts of sulfur dioxide and
nitrogen dioxide, mainly from coal burning power plants, on lakes, streams
and forests. Scientists have thoroughly documented the prodigious damage
that acid rain has caused to fishing, drinking water supply, and forests. 0
The sulfur dioxide emissions from midwestern power plants burning high-
sulfur coal travel eastward on the prevailing westerly winds, where the
emissions damage the land and water resources of the northeastern states
and eastern Canada.3 Because of the international implications of acid rain,
Clean Air Act section 115 was amended in 1977 to authorize the EPA
Administrator to direct a state to revise its SIP if the Administrator finds
that state's emissions "may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public
health or welfare in a foreign country."3 2 Carter EPA Administrator Douglas
Costle made that finding in January 1981, based on a report by the
International Joint Commission. 3 But before he could direct the midwestern
states to revise their SIP's to curtail sulfur dioxide emissions, Costle left
office.
Costle's successors reflected the Reagan Administration's deregulation
viewpoint thoroughly on this issue. Despite the urging of the northeastern
29. General Policy, Current Developments, 12 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 26, at 792 (Oct.
23, 1981) [hereinafter General Policy, Oct. 1981].
This problem has abated only slightly. In the past two years appropriations for air quality
have become caught up in the larger dilemma of the budget deficit. As recently as May 1988
state environmental officials criticized the Administration's failure to increase the EPA's budget
for air quality. Wisconsin's Director of Air Management, Donald Theiler, told the Senate
Appropriations Committee of "a rapid deterioration of the very foundation of the air pollution
control program-the base or core program-designed to control criteria pollutants such as
ozone, carbon monoxide, and particulates." More Money Should Go to Water, Air Programs
Cut by Reagan Administration, Officials Testify, 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 2, at 35 (May 13,
1988).
30. See Rosencranz & Wetstone, Acid Precipitation: National and International Respon-
ses, 22 Et4V'T 6 (1980); Lyndon, Acid Rain and the Clean Air Act: A New York State
Perspective on Acid Rain, 4 N.Y. L. SCH. J. OF INT'L AD ComP. L. 503 (1983). Acid rain
has become the term of art for what scientists call acid precipitation, encompassing snow, fog,
and mist as well as rain.
31. Scientists also have recognized that acid rain contributes to the "greenhouse effect"
in which emissions from coal burning eat away the ozone layer of the earth's upper atmosphere.
Many scientists believe the greenhouse effect likely will result in the heating of the planet,
melting portions of the polar icecaps and leading to flooding and lasting changes in climate,
agriculture, and animal habitat. See EPA Report Says 'Greenhouse' Effect Will Heat Earth
Significantly by 2040, 14 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 25, at 1048 (October 21, 1983).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 7415 (1982).
33. See Thomas v. New York, 802 F.2d 1443 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3196
(1986).
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states, three Canadian prime ministers, and many in Congress, the EPA
has consistently temporized and insisted that the acid rain phenomenon
requires further studies.3 4 These dilatory strategies stem directly from the
philosophy of deregulation and its corollary view that government controls
are justified only when proven necessary beyond a reasonable doubt and
when their benefits outweigh their costs. But the proof of causation required
by the Reagan Administration on the acid rain issue seems far more stringent
than a court would require. Those in the scientific community who deny
the corrosive effects of acid rain are probably outnumbered by those who
deny evolution or believe the earth to be flat. In addition, as discussed
earlier, 3 insistence on rigid cost-benefit analysis before taking steps to
protect the environment enables officials to compare apples and oranges.
The costs to industry are far easier to quantify than the benefits of
safeguarding a fishery, a forest, or a water supply system.
The northeastern states, which suffer the onslaught of acid rain most
directly, have mounted a variety of legal challenges to the Administration's
laissez-pluvoir approach. These states have sued to overturn the EPA's
approval of the SIP's of those midwestern states that allow high sulfur
dioxide emissions from coal burning power plants. These suits have failed,
with the courts sustaining the EPA's exercise of administrative discretion
and the Reagan EPA's view that a SIP need not take into account the
adverse effects of pollution on another state."6 Although section 126 of the
Act 37 expressly authorizes states to petition the EPA for a finding that a
major source of air pollution in another state prevents them from attaining
the air quality standards mandated by the Act, the EPA has argued
successfully that this section requires proof that a particular power plant
prevented the state from meeting its standard38-an almost impossible burden
of proof, since sulfur dioxide particles leave no fingerprints.
Most recently, attempts to invoke the 1981 Costle finding of interna-
tional pollution 9 have also misfired. The EPA under President Reagan
adamantly refused to follow the Costle finding, and the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit recently adopted the agency's
view that the Costle finding does not bind his successors since it was not
adopted pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act's rulemaking pro-
cedures.
40
Congress likewise has failed to resolve the acid rain issue, although bills
repeatedly have been filed to require the curbing of sulfur dioxide emis-
34. See Lyndon, supra note 30, at 505.
35. See text accompanying supra notes 12-14.
36. See New York v. EPA, 716 F.2d 440 (7th Cir. 1983); New York v. EPA, 710 F.2d
1200 (6th Cir. 1983).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 7426 (1982).
38. Jefferson County v. EPA, 739 F.2d 1071 (6th Cir. 1984).
39. See supra notes 32-33.
40. See Thomas v. New York, 802 F.2d 1443 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3196
(1986); see also 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-553 (1982).
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sions4 1 These bills have in recent years provided for a nationwide fee to
offset the increased cost of electricity which would otherwise be borne by
midwestern ratepayers.42 The deregulation view has benefited the midwestern
producers of high-sulfur coal and the utilities which burn it, while causing
continuing damage to fisheries, natural resources, and forests in the east
and in Canada. One of the reasons for the enactment of the Clean Air Act
was to provide enforcement at the federal level to deal with interstate and
international air pollution, where the offending state was exporting its
pollutants and therefore unlikely to act.43 But, as Senator Stafford had
predicted, " budget cuts and loss of morale at the EPA had rendered the
Act ineffectual in curtailing acid rain, despite the provisions of the Act
requiring the EPA to disapprove the SIP of a state whose emissions are
damaging to the environment of a sister state or neighboring country.
45
The 1977 amendments to the Act furnished a potential solution that
also has been undercut by the Administration's attitude. Section 12346
provides that the emission limitations adopted in a SIP may not be affected
by stack heights in excess of "good engineering practice (as determined
under regulations promulgated by the Administrator)," or any other dis-
persion technique.47 This provision was aimed at the practice of building
tall stacks to export air pollution-a major cause of acid rain from mid-
western sources damaging eastern natural resources. 4 But the EPA's regu-
lations implementing this section were too little and too late. Although the
statute required the EPA to adopt the regulations by February 7, 1978, the
Agency did not issue proposed regulations until January 1979,49 and, in a
process exacerbated by the change in Administration, did not issue its final
rules until February 1982.50 In Sierra Club v. EPA51 the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit overturned several key
provisions of those rules as arbitrary and capricious and as contrary to the
41. See, e.g., S. 1706, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 181 (1981); H.R. 4816, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1981); H.R. 3400, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
42. See H.R. 3400, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
43. See 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (1982).
44. See General Policy, Oct. 1981, supra note 29.
45. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7415, 7426 (1982); see also supra notes 32-40 and accompanying text.
EPA Administrator Anne Gorsuch at one point actually recommended amending the Act to
end its requirements that power plants reduce their sulfur dioxide emissions. Sulfur Dioxide
Percent Removal Rate Should Be Eliminated, Gorsuch Testifies, 12 Env't Rep. (BNA) No.
43, at 1328 (Feb. 19, 1982). Congress did not accept Ms. Gorsuch's invitation.
46. 42 U.S.C. § 7423 (1982).
47. Id. at § 7423(a)(1)-(2). The statute exempts stack heights in existence before December
31, 1970.
48. See Connecticut v. EPA, 696 F.2d 147, 161 (2d Cir. 1982); Sierra Club v. EPA, 719
F.2d 436, 441 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 468 U.S. 1204 (1984). The section was adopted
in response to EPA regulations authorizing tall stacks where using better technology to reduce
emissions was, inter alia, "economically unreasonable." See Sierra Club, 719 F.2d at 440.
49. 44 Fed. Reg. 2608 (1979).
50. 40 C.F.R. §§ 51.1, 51.12, 51.18 (1982).
51. 719 F.2d 436 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 468 U.S. 1204 (1984).
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Act. The Sierra Club court noted that, between the 1979 draft and the 1982
final regulations, the Agency significantly weakened the rules in several
important respects.12 Thereafter the EPA adopted revised rules, which also
are under challenge. 5
3
Most recently northeastern states and environmental groups have urged
the EPA to list the sulfate that causes acid rain as a criteria pollutant.
5 4
This listing would require states with sulfur dioxide emissions, which turn
into sulfates and inflict damage on other states, to control those emissions
as part of their SIP's. If the EPA took acid rain seriously, this step would
not be necessary.
Similarly, bills have been introduced to compel the EPA to control acid
rain, usually through a nationwide fee imposed on all electric ratepayers to
meet the cost to midwestern utilities of installing pollution-control equipment
or converting to low-sulfur coal.5 Again, this legislation would not be
needed if not for the insistence of the EPA Administrator, at times over-
ruling dissenting voices at his own agency, 6 that acid rain requires only
further study-not a solution.
The long-standing attempt to obtain effective EPA standards for haz-
ardous air pollutants likewise has run afoul of the current deregulation
philosophy, a thinly disguised device for relieving industry of the burden
of complying with the Clean Air Act. The Act treats hazardous pollutants
far more stringently than the ordinary "criteria pollutants" controlled by
the SIP's.57 The EPA itself sets and enforces emission standards for sources
of hazardous air pollution, although the EPA may delegate implementation
and enforcement to a state whose procedure is approved by the EPA
Administrator.
58
Commentators have aptly described the draconian requirements of sec-
tion 112 of the Clean Air Act as a rejection of the New Deal legislation
model of delegating to the agency the discretion to impose regulatory
52. Sierra Club v. EPA, 719 F.2d 436, 448, 456, 464, 470 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
468 U.S. 1204 (1984).
53. President Reagan Signs RCRA; Amendments; EPA to Adopt Statutory Deadlines as
Rules, 15 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 29, at 1243 (Nov. 16, 1984); Northeastern States, Two Groups
Sue EPA Asking Court to Reject Tall Stack Rules, 16 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 15, at 593 (Aug.
9, 1985).
54. States Accuse EPA of Arbitrary Action in Denying Interstate Pollution Petitions, 16
Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 34, at 1625 (Dec. 20, 1985); EPA Proposes Denial of States' Requests
for Agency Action on Acid Rain Controls, 15 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 19, at 716 (Sept. 7,
1984); see generally Lyndon, supra note 30, at 512-15.
55. See H.R. 3400, 4404, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
56. Ruckelshaus, Cabinet Council Work Group Weigh Range of Options on Acid Rain
Control, 14 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 15, at 611 (Aug. 12, 1983).
57. Hazardous air pollutants are defined in § 112 of the Act as those noncriteria pollutants
which the EPA finds "may reasonably be anticipated to result in an increase in mortality or
... serious irreversible, or incapacitating reversible, illness." 42 U.S.C. § 7412(a)(1) (1983).
The criteria pollutants dealt with in the SIP's are governed by § 110 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. §
7410 (1983); see also supra note 21.
58. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)-(e) (1983).
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measures. Instead, Congress directly ordered the EPA to act with regard to
those pollutants dangerous to human health. 9 But the EPA lagged right
from the starting gate. While section 112 required the Administrator to list
each hazardous air pollutant that the Agency intends to regulate within
ninety days after December 31, 1970, 60 it took six years for the EPA to list
four pollutants-asbestos, beryllium, mercury, and vinyl chloride-and in
the case of vinyl chloride, the Environmental Defense Fund had to sue the
EPA to compel the Agency to list the substance. 6' As a result, in 1977
Congress added section 122, requiring the EPA to decide within one year
whether to list cadmium, arsenic, or polycyclic organic matter, and to decide
within two years whether to list radioactive pollutants (radionuclides), as
hazardous air pollutants. 62
The EPA's response to this mandate was less than inspiring. The
deregulation approach had already taken hold, and from 1977 through 1981
the Agency listed only arsenic and radionuclides, as well as benzene, under
section 112.63 But the EPA failed to adopt standards for these listed
hazardous pollutants, even though section 112 requires the Agency to adopt
emission standards for each listed pollutant within 180 days.64 In the first
eleven years of the Act's existence, the EPA adopted an emission standard
for only one of these hazardous air pollutants, vinyl chloride.
In 1981 an Administration fervently committed to deregulation took
over the EPA.6 Under Administrator Anne Gorsuch, the EPA "issued no
listings, no proposed emission standards, and no final rules under Section
112."66 Federal district courts issued injunctions ordering the Agency to
adopt standards for arsenic and radionuclides, which had been listed by the
prior Administrator. 67 The arsenic standard, criticized as being far too
lenient, -presented a risk as great as two deaths per hundred for people
exposed to the maximum level for the most prolonged period of time
allowed.6 In contrast, the usual standard for toxic substances involves a
risk to human life of between one in one million and one in one hundred
thousand. 69 Critics of the arsenic standard included career EPA officials.
70
59. Graham, The Failure of Agency Forcing: The Regulation of Airborne Carcinogens
Under Section 112 of the Clean Air Act, 1985 DulrE L. J. 100, 101.
60. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1)(A) (1983).
61. See Graham, supra note 59, at 109-10.
62. 42 U.S.C. § 7422 (1983). The statute requires the EPA to consult with the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission with regard to radioactive pollutants. Id. at § 7422(c).
63. See Graham, supra note 59, at 112.
64. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1)(B) (1983).
65. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
66. See Graham, supra note 59, at 113.
67. See New York v. Gorsuch, 554 F. Supp. 1060 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (ordering EPA to
adopt arsenic emission standards); Sierra Club v. Gorsuch, 551 F. Supp. 785 (N.D. Cal. 1982)
(ordering EPA to adopt radionuclide emission standards).
68. N.Y. Times, Sept. 19, 1983, at Al, col. 1.
69. Id. (quoting spokesman for Environmental Defense Fund, Robert E. Yuhnke).
Environmental Defense Fund spokesman Yuhnke described the arsenic standard as part of a
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Following criticism of the arsenic standard, EPA Administrator William
D. Ruckelshaus took the Pilate-like step of requesting the residents of
Tacoma, where a major copper smelter discharged arsenic emissions, to
indicate, at an EPA public hearing, whether they preferred to undergo the
risk or have the smelter close.71 No one, however, made a showing that the
plant would have to close down if a stricter standard were adopted. The
Agency finally adopted stricter standards, after it decided emissions from
the smelter would be far lower than the EPA's risk modeling had indicated. 72
Section 112 does not seem to allow a weighing of costs and benefits.
The statute requires emission standards to be set "at the level which in [the
EPA Administrator's] judgment provides an ample margin of safety to
protect the public health from such hazardous air pollutant. ' 73 However,
that clear language has not inhibited the Agency in recent years from
balancing costs and benefits in setting emission standards under section 112.
The radionuclide emission standard was only adopted after a protracted
court battle, in the course of which the EPA was adjudged in contempt for
failure to obey previous injunctions. 74 The standard finally adopted in
January 1985, six years after radionuclides were listed as a hazardous
pollutant, was a standard which the Agency admitted "will not require that
sources do anything." 7"
Emission standards for two other hazardous air pollutants, benzene and
vinyl chloride, were withdrawn by the EPA during the early 1980s as too
stringent.7 6 Although other toxic substances have been suggested as hazard-
ous air pollutants, notably methyl isocyanate, the substance that was dis-
charged into the air at the Bhopal, India disaster in December 1984, the
post-1980 EPA "pattern of sacrificing human health for the economic well-being of industry."
Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.; see also Arsenic Standards for Tacoma Smelter Said to Be Tighter Than Those
Proposed, 15 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 8, at 297 (June 22, 1984) [hereinafter Arsenic Standards].
72. See Arsenic Standards, supra note 71, at 297. The State of Washington meanwhile
had adopted arsenic standards far more stringent than the EPA's. Tacoma Asarco Copper
Smelter to Close in June 1985, Company Board Announces, 15 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 9, at
389 (July 6, 1984).
73. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1)(B) (1983). The Supreme Court has held that the Occupational
Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1985), which mandates standards that "most
adequately [assure], to the extent feasible, . . . no ... material impairment of health," does
not permit the Secretary of Labor to consider cost in setting standards. American Textile
Mfrs.' Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981); see also Graham, supra note 59, at 128. See
generally Rodgers, Benefits, Costs, and Risks: Oversight of Health and Environmental Deci-
sionmaking, 4 HAxv. ENV. L. REv. 191 (1980).
74. See Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 602 F. Supp. 892, 900 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
75. See EPA Says No Action Required of Sources to Comply with Radionuclide Regu-
lations, 15 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 39, at 1531 (Jan. 25, 1985).
76. See Benzene Decision Viewed as Indicator of Ruckelshaus Approach to Air Regu-
lation, 14 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 34, at 1465 (Dec. 23, 1983) (reporting EPA's withdrawal of
benzene standard); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146 (D.C.




EPA has not acted to list them, let alone set emission standards. v For these
reasons, legislation has been introduced to designate potentially toxic subst-
ances automatically as hazardous air pollutants if the EPA fails to act on
schedule .7  Another bill would finesse the EPA's exercise of discretion by
automatically treating eighty-five specific substances as hazardous pollu-
tants.7 9 These approaches, thus far unsuccessful, would further extend the
mandatory, "agency-forcing" nature of section 112.0 Deregulation, as
practiced by the previous and, especially, the present Administration, has
rendered largely ineffectual a statute designed to compel agency action.
Congress has now become obliged to again amend the Act to place even
greater restraints on the EPA's discretion. The alternative would be to
repeat the Agency's failures and delays of the past decade in this area.
Deregulation also interfered with attaining the Clean Air Act's goal of
reducing pollution from motor vehicles, a major cause of smog. This
interference is ironic, since the inability of the states to control automotive
smog was a main reason for the enactment of the Clean Air Act. Regulation
of emissions through the design of motor vehicles is preempted by the Act.8 '
Here, as with hazardous air pollutants, 2 section 202 of the Act specifies
the measures the EPA is to take to reduce hydrocarbons, carbon monoxide,
and other air pollutants by adopting emission standards for vehicles. 3 From
1980 on, the EPA imposed standards reducing hydrocarbons, carbon mon-
oxide, and nitrogen oxides from automobiles and other light-duty vehicles
by ninety percent by 1975.4 In 1980 emission standards for heavy-duty
gasoline-powered vehicles, such as large trucks and buses, were adopted,
again mandating substantial reductions in hydrocarbons and carbon mon-
oxide.5
77. See Waxman Criticizes EPA for Not Regulating Methyl Isocyanate, Promises Push
for Controls, 15 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 34, at 1397 (Dec. 21, 1984).
78. See Plan to Provide for Automatic Listing of Hazardous Pollutants Introduced in
House, 14 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 47, at 2084 (Mar. 23, 1984); see also H.R. 5084, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
79. H.R. 2576, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); see also Nat'l Journal, June 29, 1985, at
1516.
80. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
81. 42 U.S.C. § 7543 (1983) (stating that "[n]o State or any political subdivision thereof
shall adopt or attempt to enforce any standard relating to the control of emissions from new
motor vehicles .... No State shall require certification, inspection, or any other approval
relating to the control of emissions from any new motor vehicle"); see City of Chicago v.
General Motors Corp., 467 F.2d 1262 (7th Cir. 1972). However, the states may impose emission
controls on in-use commercial vehicles, and on the resale and reregistration of in-use vehicles.
See Allway Taxi v. City of New York, 340 F. Supp. 1120 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 468 F.2d 624
(2d Cir. 1972). The Act effectively exempts California from the otherwise total federal
preemption since that state had emission standards in place prior to March 30, 1966. 42 U.S.C.
§ 7543(b) (1983).
82. See text accompanying supra note 59.
83. 42 U.S.C. § 7521 (1983).
84. 40 C.F.R. §§ 85.073-1, 85.074-1 (1987).
85. 40 C.F.R. §§ 86.301-79 to 86.348-79 (1987).
19881
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:1321
As with acid rain and hazardous air pollutants, the new Administration
veered sharply from these goals. The White House proclaimed early in 1981
that "government must not unnecessarily hamper [the auto industry's]
efforts through excessive regulation and interference," and simultaneously
announced it was repealing or weakening thirty-five auto emission standards
already adopted. 86 A paper by Budget Director David Stockman and Rep-
resentative Jack Kemp (R-N.Y.), two influential Administration advisers,
entitled "Avoiding an Economic Dunkirk," recommended relaxing emission
standards for both light and heavy-duty vehicles. 87 Whether or not these
policies averted an economic Dunkirk, they approached an environmental
Waterloo.
Since the Clean Air Act mandated many of the goals of the emission
standards adopted prior to 1981, such as the ninety percent decrease in
levels in section 202,88 the Act had to be amended to erase those gains. In
September 1981 EPA Administrator Gorsuch recommended that Congress
roll back emission standards for current and future vehicles to the more
lenient levels required of 1980 models.8 9 The National Clean Air Coalition
warned that sixteen major metropolitan areas would fail to attain the carbon
monoxide primary standard if those emission levels were relaxed.9' The
Administration introduced legislation to that effect, 91 but it failed to pass.
Although Congress refused to weaken the Clean Air Act, the EPA did
what it could, delaying "indefinitely" the proposed standards for heavy-
duty vehicles, 92 until ordered by the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia to adopt standards for nitrogen oxides and particulate
matter as required by the Act.93 The EPA finally adopted the standards as
the tide of environmental deregulation ebbed in the mid-80s, and the
standards were sustained by the courts.
94
86. N.Y. Times, Apr. 7, 1981, at Al, col. 2. Standards governing particulate matter
emitted from diesel-powered vehicles that were adopted under Costle were upheld by the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 655 F.2d 318 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
87. See Stockman Designated to Head OMB, Proposes Major Agency Rule Changes, I 1
Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 34, at 1257, Dec. 19, 1980.
88. See supra note 84.
89. See U.S. Automakers, EPA Call on Congress to Roll Back Current Emissions
Standards, 12 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at 636 (Sept. 25, 1981); see also Court Denies EPA
Request to Reconsider February Deadline for Land Disposal Rules, 12 Env't Rep. (BNA) No.
33, at 972 (Dec. 11, 1981) (EPA urges up to 50% relaxation of carbon monoxide standard
for light-duty vehicles).
90. Id.; see also Senate Panel Delays Auto Standard Vote to Consider New, Controversial
Analysis, 12 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 34, at 1004 (Dec. 18, 1981).
91. H.R. 5252, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). See Waxman Says H.R. 5252 Would Slow
Progress in Clean Air, Weaken Important Sections, 12 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 41, at 1287
(Feb. 5, 1982).
92. See Two- Year Delay For Catalyst Truck Controls, Indefinite Easement for Heaviest
Trucks Set, 14 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 26, at 1139 (Oct. 28, 1983).
93. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA)
1953 (D.D.C. 1984).




Federal regulation of water was far more deeply entrenched than was
its jurisdiction over air quality when deregulation arrived. National control
over the obstruction of, or discharge of refuse into, the navigable waters
of the United States stemmed from the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899. 95
That statute, which requires a permit from the United States Army Corps
of Engineers, was enacted to safeguard the navigability of those waterways,
but has been used since the 1960s to regulate the discharge of pollutants as
well. 96 In 1972 the Congress, building on earlier statutes, 97 enacted the law
that later became known as the Clean Water Act, 9 establishing a compre-
hensive scheme to control water pollution through a permit program and
water quality standards.9 Other federal statutes regulate ocean dumping' °°
and groundwater,' 0' areas not covered by the Clean Water Act. 02
Controlling discharges through graduated fees instead of permits had
been proposed for water pollution as early as the 1960s.10 3 The idea dovetails
with the concept of deregulation in many ways, since the fee is designed to
have market forces, rather than government controls, provide the incentive
for reducing effluent discharges. ° 4 But the idea of taxing pollution never
caught on, partly because, as even its proponents conceded, it is effective
Beyond the scope of this paper are the related struggles over the transportation control plans
to improve air quality in major metropolitan areas through techniques such as state inspection
of catalytic converters and exhaust systems, limits on parking, and the like. These battles
hinged on federal versus state power, rather than on deregulation. See, e.g., Friends of the
Earth v. Carey, 535 F.2d 165 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 902 (1977); Friends of
the Earth v. Carey, 552 F.2d 25 (2d Cir. 1977); Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1975),
vacated as moot, 431 U.S. 99 (1977); Council of Commuter Orgs. v. Gorsuch, 683 F.2d 648
(2d Cir. 1982); Council of Commuter Orgs. v. Thomas, 799 F.2d 879 (2d Cir. 1986).
95. 33 U.S.C. §§ 401-687 (1986 & 1988 Supp.).
96. See United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224 (1966) (criminal prosecution
for discharge of aviation fuel); United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482 (1960)
(enjoining discharge of effluent from steel mill).
97. Water Quality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903 (1965); Clean Water
Restoration Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-753, 80 Stat. 1246 (1966); Water Quality Improvement
Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-224, 84 Stat. 91 (1970).
98. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). The 1972 statute, originally entitled
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, is universally referred to as the Clean Water Act.
99. The permit program is mandated by 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). The
water quality standards are mandated by 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
100. The Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1445 (1982
& Supp. IV 1986).
101. The Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300f to 300j-1l (1982).
102. The Clean Water Act is limited to surface waters and defines the "waters of the
United States," to which it applies, to include the territorial seas offshore as far as three
miles. See 33 U.S.C. § 1362 (7), (8) (1982). Discharges from land-based point sources such as
pipes are covered by the Clean Water Act both within and beyond the three-mile limit. Id. §
1362 (12). Discharges from vessels and barges into the oceans more than three miles offshore
are not regulated under the Act.
103. Lahey, supra note 25, at 315.
104. Id. at 318.
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only if closely monitored, 0 5 and partly because of the strong public support
for imposing penalties on those who pollute.
The Reagan Administration's deregulation rhetoric was directed more
at air quality, 10 6 but was broad enough to apply to the EPA's water-quality
programs as well. Under Administrator Gorsuch, the EPA proclaimed its
intent to abandon effluent discharge permits and retreat to water quality
standards alone. 107 This plan would have been extremely detrimental to
water quality since it would have deprived the Agency, and those states
which followed its lead, of the ability to penalize dischargers for violation
of the limits on particular pollutants set forth in their permits. Water quality
standards, while equally important, are keyed to the purity of the particular
body of water, not the amount and nature of the discharge by a given
source. The EPA then urged a cost-benefit test'08 for water quality stan-
dards,'09 which would weaken the standards while abandoning the permit
program established by the Act. Fortunately, nothing came of these pro-
posals.
The treatment of toxic chemicals under the Clean Water Act has had
nearly as frustrating a history as that of hazardous air pollutants." 0 Section
307 of the Clean Water Act originally mandated an EPA list of toxic
pollutants and effluent standards for each pollutant, to be adopted by the
Agency based on health, not economics."' The EPA was to take into
account the toxicity and hazard to human health of each such pollutant, as
well as the ability of the substance to persist in the environment." 2 However,
after several years the Agency listed and proposed standards for only nine
toxic water pollutants, "3 and even as to these pollutants, the EPA failed
to adopt enforceable standards." 4 A suit by the Natural Resources Defense
Council, an environmental public-interest law firm, to compel the EPA to
adopt standards for the nine, and to list other toxic pollutants, ended in
the "Flannery Decree," a court approved consent agreement." 5 The settle-
105. Id. at 334.
106. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
107. See Opposition to Major Water Act Changes Hinted By Chafee; Quick Action
Expected, 12 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 42, at 1307 (Feb. 12, 1982).
108. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (discussing Reagan Administration adoption
of cost-benefit analysis of environmental regulations).
109. See Revisions to Water Quality Rule Moving Through EPA Review Process, 12 Env't
Rep. (BNA) No. 45, at 1391 (March 5, 1982).
110. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (discussing hazardous air pollutants).
111. 33 U.S.C. § 1317 (1982).
112. Id.
113. 40 C.F.R. § 129.1-129.105 (1987). In 1973 the EPA listed as toxic water pollutants
aldrin/dieldrin, benzidine, cadmium, cyanide, DDT, endrin, polychlorinated biphenyls (PCB's),
mercury, and toxaphene. Cadmium, cyanide, and mercury are no longer listed as toxic
pollutants. Id.
114. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 8 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA)




ment, embodied in the 1977 amendment to section 307,116 required the EPA
to adopt health-related standards for certain toxic pollutants, but enabled
the EPA to retreat to best available technology standards for the others. 17
Final standards for effluent from specific industries were to be adopted by
July 1, 1980.118 When the EPA missed that deadline, it moved to amend
the decree, claiming changed circumstances and the need for administrative
flexibility." 9 The Natural Resources Defense Council argued in response
that the EPA "manufactured most of their 'changed circumstances' through
proposed budget cuts [and] internal resource allocations .... ,,12o The United
States District Court for the District of Columbia eventually amended the
decree, giving the Agency another two years.' 2' By November 1982 the EPA
released final standards for twelve industries, including iron and steel,
aluminum, copper, petroleum, and inorganic chemicals.'2 Administrator
Gorsuch announced that the EPA was preparing standards for the remaining
eleven industries covered by the decree, and "intends to stay on schedule."'1
2
Eventually the toxic water pollutants program was restored to effectiveness,
although mainly reduced to the best available technology level of ordinary
pollutants as permitted under the Flannery decree.Iu
The EPA's deregulation philosophy also has pervaded its approach to
the issue of "backsliding," or relaxing the limits of permits already issued.
As noted, the Clean Water Act relies on both effluent limitations and water
quality standards.125 The Reagan Administration's view, however, was ex-
pressed by Frederick Eidsness, EPA Assistant Administrator for Water,
who stated that controls greater than needed to meet water quality standards
amount to "treatment for treatment's sake."' 126 This facile description
116. Pub. L. No. 95-217, §§ 53(a), (b), 54(a), 91 Stat. 1589-1591 (1977).
117. See 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a) (1982); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train,
8 Env't Cas. (BNA) 2120 (D.D.C. 1976). The consent decree was amended the following year.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 12 Env't Rep. Cas. 1833 (D.D.C. 1979),
aff'd in part and remanded in part sub nom. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Costle,
636 F.2d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 1980), upheld on remand sub nom. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 16 Env't Rep. Cas. 2084 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd sub nom. Citizens
for a Better Environment v. Gorsuch, 718 F.2d 1117 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom.
Union Carbide Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 1219 (1984); see
also Wyche, The Regulation of Toxic Pollutants Under the Clean Water Act: EPA's Ten Year
Rulemaking Nears Completion, 15 NAT. REsoUtCES J. 511 (1983).
118. 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a)(2) (1982).
119. Wyche, supra note 117, at 524.
120. Id. at 525.
121. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 17 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA)
2013 (D.D.C. 1982).
122. See Effluent Guidelines Proposed By EPA for Six Industries; Set for Six Others, 13
Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 28, at 1027 (Nov. 12, 1982).
123. Id.
124. See Van Putten & Jackson, The Dilution of the Clean Water Act, 19 U. Mica. J.
L. REF. 863, 875 n.49 (1986).
125. See text accompanying supra note 99.
126. See Van Putten & Jackson, supra note 124, at 881 n.80 (quoting Frederick Eidsness).
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overlooked the need for accountability of particular sources through a
permit program to enable the regulating agency to know what pollutants
are being discharged, as well as the need to attribute violations of water
quality standards to particular sources, in order to have effective enforce-
ment.
Concerned about possible backsliding by sources, the EPA in 1978
adopted a regulation authorizing the limits in a Clean Water Act permit to
be relaxed only in the event of a material and substantial change in
circumstances or a permit whose limits were stricter than the relevant effluent
guidelines required.1 27 A 1980 amendment to the Act also allowed relaxing
permit limits "to correspond to subsequently-promulgated guideline limita-
tions when increased production significantly reduces treatment effi-
ciency."'' 28 In 1982 EPA Administrator Gorsuch proposed to allow permit
backsliding up to the level of subsequently-adopted effluent guidelines
permitting greater discharge of pollutants. 29 In effect, this proposal would
have undermined the Clean Water Act's mandate of continued progress
toward ending the discharge of pollutants completely. 130 Congressional out-
cry was immediate.' 3 ' The EPA backed off, rescinding its proposed amend-
ment. 32 The EPA ultimately adopted a regulation allowing increased
discharges of pollutants only if "previous case-by-case limitations prove to
be an incorrect assessment of the discharger's capabilities."'1 33 Locking the
EPA firmly into this position, the 1987 amendments to the Clean Water
Act now bar backsliding unless justified by material and substantial changes,
new data, or similar evidence. 13Congress, reluctant to rely on EPA discre-
tion in an Administration hostile to environmental concern, explicitly nar-
rowed the scope of that discretion.
EPA enforcement under the Clean Water Act likewise reflected the
advent and decline of the deregulation approach. Statistics gathered by the
General Accounting Office show a sharp decrease in water-quality enforce-
ment actions, from 1523 in 1977 to 736 in 1979 and, even more dramatically,
to 204 in 1982.115 During this period the EPA acknowledged (or boasted) a
41.50 reduction in compliance inspections and a 25.5% decline in Clean
Water Act enforcement personnel. 136 This lack of activity was not due to a
lack of enforcement opportunities. The Agency conceded that 24% of Clean
127. 40 C.F.R. § 125.31 (1978).
128. 40 C.F.R. § 122.62()(2)(v) (1981).
129. 47 Fed. Reg. 52,072, 52,084 (1982).
130. See 33 U.S.C.A. § 1251(a)(1) (West 1986) (declaring that "it is the national goal
that the discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters be eliminated by 1985").
131. See Van Putten & Jackson, supra note 124, at 885.
132. 49 Fed. Reg. 37,999, 38,021 (1984).
133. 49 C.F.R. § 122.44(l)(2)(i); 49 C.F.R. § 122.62 (a)(17) (1986).
134. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1342(o) (West Supp. 1988).
135. Andreen, Beyond Words of Exhortation: The Congressional Prescription for Vigorous
Federal Enforcement of the Clean Water Act, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 202, 204 (1987).
136. Id. at 205.
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Water Act permit holders were in significant violation of their permits. 3 7
With the replacement of Gorsuch by William Ruckelshaus as EPA Admin-
istrator, enforcement actions promptly veered upward, to 887 in 1983 and
1,828 in 1984.138 Ruckelshaus announced early on: "Let me disabuse anyone
who believes-EPA, while I am there, will not have the will and the
determination to enforce the laws as written by Congress."' 3 9
4. HAzARDous SUBSTANCES
The EPA's refusal to come to grips with the problems of hazardous
waste furnishes a stark example of its deregulation approach on collision
course with its mandate to protect public health. Unlike air and water
quality, the improper disposal of hazardous waste was not a major envi-
ronmental concern until hazardous waste from New York's Love Canal,
Missouri's Times Beach, and other landfill sites began to leak into ground-
water in the late 1970s. Public insistence on strict controls and redress led
to enactment of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)140 in
1976 and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act (CERCLA) 4' in 1980. Like the Clean Air Act and Clean
Water Act, these statutes initially delegated broad discretion to the EPA to
wield regulatory controls in a highly complex area. But here too the EPA's
repeated failure to act effectively led Congress to remove much of its
discretion and expressly legislate detailed controls. This was the context in
which Representative James J. Florio stated, as noted earlier, that "the test
at EPA was not whether a regulatory system met the statutory prescription
to protect the environment, but rather whether it met the Administration's
ideological regulatory standard [which] actually subverted the statutory
goals."1
42
RCRA required the EPA to adopt regulations controlling the land
disposal of hazardous waste within eighteen months of its enactment.' 43 It
took six years and a legal action' 44 before the EPA promulgated these
regulations, and the rules imposed no immediate mandate at all on hazardous
waste facilities. 45 The regulations required a facility to meet the standards
contained therein only upon applying for a final permit under the Act.'"
In addition, the regulations continued to authorize the land disposal of
hazardous waste in steel drums even though this disposal method had been
137. Id.
138. Id. at 207.
139. Id.
140. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1982).
141. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982).
142. See Florio, Congress as Reluctant Regulator: Hazardous Waste Policy in the 1980's,
3 YALE J. ON REG. 351, 358-59 (1986).
143. 42 U.S.C. § 6924 (1983 & 1988 Supp.).
144. Environmental Defense Fund v. Thomas, 627 F. Supp. 566 (D.D.C. 1986).
145. 40 C.F.R. Pts. 264, 265, 267 (1987).
146. 40 C.F.R. § 264.3 (1987).
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shown to be highly dangerous. 47 The rules also failed to require double
liners for drums, a leak-detection system, or the monitoring of groundwater
for contamination. 48 Not until October 1986, after repeated exhortation
from Congress, environmental organizations, and residents of areas adjacent
to hazardous waste sites, did the EPA draft regulations banning the land
disposal of untreated hazardous waste. 49 In its post-Gorsuch reformation,
the EPA also enacted stringent financial responsibility requirements for
hazardous waste landfills. 50
Deregulation attitudes likewise inhibited the Agency's embrace of CER-
CLA, the statute creating the Superfund and authorizing the EPA cleanup
of hazardous waste sites. Representative Florio suggested the EPA's hidden
agenda was to avoid Congressional reauthorization of the tax on industry
enacted by CERCLA, which was slated to expire September 30, 1985."'
And indeed EPA Administrator Gorsuch candidly avowed to the Cabinet
Council on Natural Resources and the Environment that "[w]e are trying
to avoid 'son of Superfund.' 11112 To achieve that goal, the Agency under
Gorsuch had little interest in cleaning up a prodigious number of sites, and
in fact had only completed remedial action at eight sites-out of 850 on
the National Priorities List for cleanup-by 1985Y.15 Although the EPA had
adopted maximum permitted contamination levels for groundwater in the
Safe Drinking Water Act,154 its plan for remediation of hazardous waste
sites did not require adherence to those levels. 55 Instead of adopting
objective nationwide standards for hazardous waste site remediation, the
EPA varied its requirements from one location to another in the Gorsuch
era, causing a Congressional Report to conclude that "the identity of the
private parties responsible and the political affiliation of local officials were
allowed to influence the cleanup requirements significantly. 1 ' 6 The EPA
147. EPA Suspends Ban on Liquids in Landfills, Proposes Alternative Rule; Lawsuit
Filed, 12 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 45, at 1387 (Mar. 5, 1982).
148. See Florio, supra note 142, at 362-63.
149. RCRA Land Ban Among Most Significant Rules that Apply to Superfund Cleanups,
EPA Says, 17 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 27, at 1015 (Oct. 31, 1986).
150. Draft Land Disposal Rules Outline Framework, Would Delay Ban Two Years for
Some Solvents, 16 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 34, at 1619 (Dec. 20, 1985).
151. Florio, supra note 142, at 363. The September 30, 1985 termination date is in 42
U.S.C.A. § 9653 (West 1983 & 1988 Supp.) (repealed effective January 1, 1987, per 1988
Supp.).
152. Florio, supra note 142, at 364.
153. Id. at 364-65.
154. 42 U.S.C. § 300f-300j (1982).
155. See The National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, 40
C.F.R. § 300 (1985). The Agency rationalized its refusal to require adherence to Safe Drinking
Water Act levels "by arguing that each site was unique and that [it] needed flexibility to
respond to each individual site differently." See Florio, supra note 142, at 365.
156. Florio, supra note 142, at 365-66; see also SUrcoMM. ON OvEasior AND INVESTI-
GATIONS, HOUSE CoMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 98TH CONG., 2D SESS., INVESTIGATION OF
THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, REPORT ON THE PRESIDENT'S CLAIM OF EXECUTE
PRIVILEGE OVER EPA DOCUMENTS, ABUSES IN THE SUPERFUND PROGRAM, AND OTHER MATTERS
121-57 (Comm. Print 1984).
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enacted uniform nationwide standards only after legal action by the Envi-
ronmental Defense fund.1
57
Both the 1984 amendments to RCRA 58 and the 1986 "SARA" reau-
thorization of CERCLA 59 embodied the powerful Congressional intent to
restrict the Agency's discretion, which had been too often exercised to delay
these statutes or render them ineffectual. For example, Congress now
required landfills under interim permits to apply for final permits by
November 8, 1985160 and to use double liners and a leachate collection
system, pending enactment of EPA standards.16' Similarly, the amended
statute imposed performance standards for new storage tanks pending
adoption of EPA regulations. '1
The Congressional enactment of detailed standards of the sort ordinarily
delegated to administrative agencies has, predictably, raised some eyebrows.
Senator Symms (R.-Idaho) objected to the level of detail in the RCRA
amendments, asking, rhetorically, "[c]an any member of this body ex-
plain... why the lower liner of a hazardous waste disposal facility should
have a permeability of lx10-7 centimeter per second?' 1 63 The answer to
Senator Symms' question lay in the determination of Congress not to have
these vital statutes thwarted by a hostile, deregulation-bent EPA. 
64
The Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) 65 suffered similarly from
application of the deregulation approach. This result was particularly ironic
because TSCA was originally seen as an ounce-of-prevention statute, de-
signed to allow the EPA to interdict dangerous chemical compounds before
they entered the marketplace and the environment. 66 TSCA authorizes the
EPA to order manufacturers to test new chemical substances, or old
substances put to new uses, about which data are insufficient, if the EPA
finds either that the product may present an unreasonable risk to health or
157. Environmental Defense Fund v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, No.
82-2234 (D.C. Cir. 1984), settled in Jan. 1984. See Florio, supra note 142, at 366.
158. Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3224-3293 (1984).
159. The Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat.
1615-1782 (1986) (amending CERCLA, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601-9657 (West 1983 & 1988 Supp.)).
160. 42 U.S.C.A. § 6925(e)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1988).
161. Id. at § 6924(o)(1)(A) (,Vest Supp. 1988).
162. Id. at § 6991b(g).
163. 130 CONG. R~c. S13812 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1984); see also Florio, supra note 142, at
371.
164. "[Bletween 1980 and 1983, Congress came to perceive EPA as an agency unwilling
or unable to fulfill its mandate of environmental protection. Almost every section of the
RCRA Amendments might be read as expressing a sense of frustration over the pace and
scope of EPA action. For these reasons Congress elected to act, in effect, as its own regulatory
agency." Mugdan & Adler, The 1984 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Amendments:
Congress as a Regulatory Agency, 10 CoLum. J. EbvTm. L. 215, 217 (1985).
165. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 2601-2629 (West 1982 & Supp. 1988).
166. See Kraus, Environmental Carcinogenesis: Regulation on the Frontiers of Science, 7
ENvTL. L. 83 (1976); Bronstein, The New Toxic Substances Control Act, 13 FoRuM 371 (1978).
But see Gaynor, The Toxic Substances Control Act: A Regulatory Morass, 30 VArN. L. Rav.
1149 (1977).
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the environment or that a substantial number of persons will be exposed to
it.167 The EPA then has the power to restrict or ban the chemical, either
until data are available or after the data show it to create an unreasonable
risk. 1 6 8 The EPA was to publish a list of chemicals by 1977 to be tested, 6 9
but failed to do so and was sued. 70 The change in administrations and
severe budget cuts pushed TSCA further back on the EPA's list of priorities.
In an attempt to finesse the litigation, the Gorsuch EPA promulgated a
regulation allowing manufacturers to test their own chemicals on the EPA's
priority list for testing. 7' In a second legal challenge, the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York held that voluntary
testing by manufacturers violated TSCA's requirement that the EPA itself
test the chemicals. 7 2 The court further directed the Agency to act within a
reasonable time to adopt proper testing procedures.
17
1
While illegally delegating authority to the industry to perform testing
that TSCA requires the EPA to perform, the EPA under Gorsuch rigidly
insisted on "good science"- "scientific evidence and not ... rumor and
soothsaying" ' 74-as a basis for regulating toxic substances. This approach
has been aptly described as "a subterfuge designed to accomplish de facto
deregulation. ' 1 7  It demands proof beyond a reasonable doubt before the
EPA will act to restrict a substance believed to be toxic. This stands
scientific prudence on its head, because insisting on such certainty guarantees
inaction as long as any doubt exists. No rational person would continue to
drink water reasonably thought to be polluted while awaiting absolute proof.
Yet the EPA during the Gorsuch regime adopted that view, in effect
absolving industrial polluters in the absence of the elusive certain showing
of risk. In the real world, risk assessment takes place based on reasonable
probabilities, not on impossible-to-prove certainty. 176
167. 15 U.S.C. § 2603(a) & (b) (1982).
168. Id. at §§ 2604(e)-(f), 2605.
169. Id. at § 2603(e).
170. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle, 15 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1858
(S.D.N.Y. 1980).
171. 46 Fed. Reg. 53,775 (1981); 47 Fed. Reg. 335 (1982).
172. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 595 F. Supp. 1255 (S.D.N.Y.
1984).
173. Id. at 1261.
174. N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1982, at A30, col. 4.
175. Latin, Good Science, Bad Regulation, and Toxic Risk Assessment, 5 YAE J. oN
REG. 89, 94 (1988).
176. See American Textile Mfrs' Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981) (upholding risk
assessment for cotton dust standard in workplace); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 25 (D.C.
Cir. 1976) (upholding assessment that lead in air endangers public health), cert. denied, 426
U.S. 941 (1977). The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
there stated, "Petitioners suggest that anything less than certainty, that any speculation, is
irresponsible. But when statutes seek to avoid environmental catastrophe, can preventive, albeit
uncertain, decisions legitimately be so labeled?" Id. at 25. See generally as to risk assessment
Rodgers, Benefits, Costs, and Risks: Oversight of Health and Environmental Decisionmaking,




In the Rocky Mountain States, deregulation on the part of the Reagan
Administration took the form of joining the so-called sagebrush rebellion.
This alliance was odd even for a deregulation-bent administration, because
the rebellion was a movement to divest the federal government of ownership
of one of its most valuable assets, the millions of acres administered by the
Bureau of Land Management in the Department of the Interior. 77 The
rebellion's proponents sought land reform in reverse. They sought to remove
these lands from federal protection in order to make them available for
development, strip mining, and clear-cutting of timber. This raid on the
Treasury was thinly camouflaged as a proposal to turn these lands over to
the states. 7 8 But the Mountain states traditionally encouraged private de-
velopment of their own lands, often selling thousands of acres for far under
market value, and bestowing preferential rights on ranchers, timber com-
panies, and mineral developers."
9
The myth that the state governments were "closer to the people" is
belied by the contrasting history of federal and state stewardship of public
lands. The federal record over the decades, while far from impeccable,
shows significant resistance to incursions into public lands to extract minerals
or timber.8 0 The states, on the other hand, have tended to be far more
responsive to developmental interests. Some states have statutes and even
constitutional provisions requiring state-owned lands to be used at tl-eir
maximum monetary value.' 8' Traditionally, the Western states have leased
public lands for ranching and mining for much lower fees then the United
States imposes.
82
Attempts to seize control over these vast national assets are not new.
They were eloquently condemned by the eminent historian Bernard De Voto
177. See Babbitt, Federalism and the Environment: An Intergovernmental Perspective of
the Sagebrush Rebellion, 12 ENvmL L. 847 (1982); Huffman, Governing America's Resources:
Federalism in the 1980's, 12 EvmTL. L. 863 (1982).
178. Babbitt, supra note 177, at 849.
179. Id.
180. See, e.g., The Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C.A. §§
3101-3233 (West 1985 & Supp. 1988) (giving 45 million acres of prime wilderness to National
Park System in 1980 and 54 million acres to Fish and Wildlife Service for wildlife refuges);
see also Strickland v. Morton, 519 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1975) (upholding denial by Secretary of
Interior of permit for homesteading); Diamond Ring Ranch, Inc. v. Morton, 531 F.2d 1397
(10th Cir. 1976) (sanctions by Secretary of Interior against violation of lease allowing limited
grazing on Bureau of Land Management lands); Krueger v. Morton, 539 F.2d 235 (D.C. Cir.
1976) (denial of coal prospecting permit in order to prepare environmentally protective
program); Council on Environmental Quality, 1982 Annual Report, pp. 143-163 (stating that
"hundreds of millions of acres of [federal] public land have been withdrawn from entry,
restricting the mineral exploration efforts of the American mining industry"). But see Coggins,
Of Succotash Syndromes and Vacuous Platitudes: The Meaning of "Multiple Use, Sustained
Yield" for Public Land Management, 53 U. CoLo. L. Rsv. 229 (1981).
181. See, e.g., CoLO. CoNsT. art. IX, § 10; WYo. CONST. art. XVIII, § 3; MONT. CODE
ANN. § 77-1-601 (1981).
182. See Babbitt, supra note 177, at 851.
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forty years ago."8 3 But never before had the federal government announced
its eager participation in the looting of its own patrimony.
In the event, attempts to amend the Federal Land Policy and Manage-
ment Act 84 were repulsed in Congress. But the Reagan Administration urged
deregulation and actual conveyance of federal lands at every step. A Heritage
Foundation report as early as January 1981 urged the incoming Adminis-
tration to transfer most public lands to the states, with the United States
to retain access and recreational and mineral rights, and to sell the national
parks outright to private owners such as conservation organizations.' 85 The
Heritage Foundation failed to explain how these groups were to purchase
and maintain the parks. Perhaps it tacitly assumed these groups would resell
the parks to developers. Thereafter Secretary of the Interior Watt expended
much rhetoric on urging private development of federal lands, such as an
unsuccessful attempt to overturn a decision of his predecessor, Cecil Andrus,
disapproving surface mining adjacent to Bryce Canyon National Park. 86
Secretary Watt also delayed and weakened the federal surface mining
regulations requiring operators to restore strip mined land to its original
contours. 18 7 The United States District Court for the District of Columbia
invalidated regulations that would have both authorized strip mining in
many parks and wilderness areas 8 and unlawfully delegated authority to
the states to regulate mining on federal lands.8 9 The Department's attempt
to return regulatory authority to the states was ironic since the very purpose
of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act' 90 was to impose federal
regulation because of the failure of the states effectively to control strip
mining. '9'
183. Id. at 852.
184. 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1701-1784 (West 1986 & Supp. 1988).
185. Report Urges Replacing Standards with Taxes, Dropping Sewer Program, 11 ENviR.
REP. (BNA) No. 38, at 1616-17 (Jan. 16, 1981).
186. Watt Asks Justice Department to Seek Remand of Andrus Decision on Bryce Canyon,
12 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) No. 22, at 640 (Sept. 25, 1981); Federal Court Denies Watt's Motion
for Remand of Bryce Canyon Decision, id. No. 39, at 1216 (Jan. 22, 1982).
187. See Wash. Post, May 24, 1981, at C7, col. 5 (Watt espouses ending "excessive and
burdensome regulations" of surface mining); Christian Science Monitor, Apr. 19, 1982, p. 2
(Department announced plans to revise 46 surface-mining regulations, delayed when National
Wildlife Federation sued to enjoin them); OSM Proposes Mining Rules for Areas Lacking
Enough Spoil to Backfill Highwall, 12 ENVIR. Rip. (BNA) No. 38, p. 1144 (Jan. 15, 1982)
(Department proposed deleting requirement that operator restore lands to original contour if
not enough spoil on hand to replace contour).
188. In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, 620 F. Supp. 1519 (D.D.C.
1985).
189. In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA)
1193 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
190. 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 1201-1328 (West 1986 & Supp. 1988).
191. Congress so found. See 30 U.S.C.A. § 1201(g) (West 1986); Hodel v. Virginia Surface
Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981) (upholding constitutionality of Act and
discussing reasons for its enactment); see also Harris & Close, Redefining the State Regulatory





The attempt to deregulate in the environmental area foundered when it
became evident that weakening federal controls over air and water quality
and hazardous waste would endanger public health. Similarly, turning public
lands and strip mining regulation over to the states would in large measure
put the fox in charge of the henhouse. Overwhelming public awareness of
these concerns enabled Congress, together with dedicated civil servants
within the Administration itself, to turn aside deregulation on most fronts.
With acid rain, 92 however, deregulation has prevented any meaningful
steps to control a steadily worsening injury to our forests, lakes, and water
supply. This is so because, in contrast to most other important environmental
issues, region has been pitted against region and in the absence of federal
recognition of the severity of the problem a national consensus has been
slow to emerge.
Even in other areas of environmental protection, the damage inflicted
by several years of budget cuts and lack of responsible leadership at the
EPA and Department of the Interior was serious. When enforcement and
rulemaking are hamstrung, law-abiding citizens suffer while those who cut
corners go unpunished.
As aquifers become endangered, landfills near capacity, and waste
appears on our beaches, it is unlikely that environmental protection will
ever again be deregulated. The awareness is now close to universal that
environmental laws can no more be ignored as a matter of government
policy than can the criminal code. Moreover, the overwhelming public
rejection of deregulation has enabled many to see through those who attempt
to justify it, in the environmental area, as a dictate of economic philosophy.
It was, after all, recognized more than half a century ago by Justice Cardozo
that "[m]any an appeal to freedom [of contract] is the masquerade of
privilege or inequality seeking to entrench itself behind the catchword of a
principle.'' 9
192. See supra notes 30-56 and accompanying text.
193. See Cardozo, Mr. Justice Holmes, 44 HARv. L. REv. 682, 687-88 (1931).
1988] 1343

